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This paper attempts to identify the major factors associated with some of the failures 
and successes of integrated watershed management policies and projects with a 
particular emphasis on the uplands of mainland Southeast Asia.  It argues that 
many policy measures have been misguided by failing to acknowledge the multi-
dimensional facets of sustainable watershed management and putting too much 
emphasis on command-and-control approaches to resource management and one-
size-fits-all conservation models.  Attempts to introduce soil and water conservation 
measures, for instance, have largely failed because they concentrated merely on the 
technical feasibility and potential ecological effects, while neglecting economic 
viability and socio-cultural acceptance.  The production of agricultural commodities, 
on the other hand, has mostly been market-driven and often induced boom and bust 
cycles that compromised the ecological and social dimensions of sustainability. 
Purely community-based approaches to watershed management, on their part, have 
often failed to address issues of elite capture and competing interests within and 
between heterogeneous uplands communities.
Drawing on a review of recent experience and on lessons from initiatives in a 
long-term collaborative research program in Thailand (The Uplands Program) aimed 
at bridging the various dimensions of sustainability in the Southeast Asian uplands, 
this paper discusses how a socially, institutionally and ecologically sustainable mix 
of agricultural production, ecosystem services and rural livelihood opportunities can 
be achieved through incentive-based policies and multi-stakeholder partnerships 
that attempt to overcome the (perceived) antagonism between conservation and 
development in upland watersheds of Southeast Asia.
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Policies and programs towards sustainable upland development and integrated watershed 
management in Southeast Asia have produced mixed results since concerns for upland 
areas1) have moved from the fringes of public interest to the center of national and inter-
national policy agendas.  The mountainous regions of Thailand, Myanmar and Laos form-
ing the Golden Triangle started to become a focus already in the late 1960s and 1970s 
when opium poppy cultivation was thriving and national security in these border regions 
topped the political agenda.  The upland areas of Indonesia and the Philippines came into 
the international limelight following the timber boom of the 1970s and 1980s that left 
large areas denuded of forests and prone to environmental degradation (Li 2002).  In 
Vietnam and Laos, upland development and conservation issues became more popular 
only in the late 1980s with the beginning of the doi moi (renovation) and jintanakan mai
(new economic mechanism) policies of the Vietnamese and Laotian governments respec-
tively, and the rising interest in modernizing the marginal areas of the countries associ-
ated with these policy shifts (e.g. Friederichsen and Neef 2010).  Today, governments in 
all these countries—with the exception of Myanmar—have stepped up their efforts to 
protect the fragile natural resources of upland areas and to promote sustainable agricul-
tural practices and soil and water conservation measures.  In this context, “integrated 
watershed management” has become a major buzzword alongside the terms “participa-
tion” and “sustainability.”
In this paper I aim to identify some of the major factors associated with the many 
failures and few success stories of integrated watershed management policies and  projects 
in the Southeast Asian uplands.  Integrated watershed management is defined in the 
context of this paper as all policies and practical measures that affect upland watersheds 
as socio-ecological systems with human-nature and upstream-downstream interde-
pendencies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the common 
failures of mono-dimensional approaches to watershed management.  Section III outlines 
three major components of a comprehensive strategy that can bridge the various dimen-
sions of sustainability and bring the state, the market and the community together in 
support of integrated watershed management.  These components are (1) collaborative 
natural resource governance, (2) payments for environmental services (PES), and (3) 
1) Upland areas and their associated watersheds in Southeast Asia are defined in this paper as areas 
that range from 500 m above sea level to high-elevation mountains and are characterized by high 
ecological fragility, ethnic heterogeneity and various degrees of socio-political and economic mar-
ginalization.
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rural processing and marketing networks.  Drawing on the findings from a case study in 
northern Thailand, I argue that while none of these components alone is sufficient, the 
combination of all three approaches in the form of well-orchestrated multi-stakeholder 
partnerships has great potential to support sustainable rural livelihoods and promote 
sound natural resource management in the Southeast Asian uplands.  Section IV dis-
cusses the results and concludes the paper.
II Mono-Dimensional Approaches to Sustainable Watershed Management
Many past development and conservation efforts in the mountains of Southeast Asia did 
not have a long-term impact because they tended to focus on one dimension of sustain-
ability only (Fig. 1) rather than employing a multi-dimensional approach that considers 
the ecological, economic and social dimensions of sustainability.  The mono-dimensional 
approaches often go along with a one-sided emphasis on the state (in charge of the eco-
logical dimension), the market (covering the economic dimension) or the community 
(representing the social dimension).
Fig. 1 The Shortcomings of Mono-dimensional Approaches to Watershed Management
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II-1 State-Driven Natural Resource Conservation: Biased towards the Ecological 
Dimension of Sustainability
Forest departments in Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia manage 40%, 55% and 
70% respectively of these nations’ total land area (Fox et al. 2009).  Although the failure 
of the state-paradigm of forest conservation has become evident, most Southeast Asian 
governments continue to pursue a command-and-control forest conservation policy. 
Communal systems of resource management have often been ignored, downgraded and 
undermined (e.g. Vandergeest 1996; Anan 1998; Neef et al. 2003; Forsyth and Walker 
2008).  Fuelled by the global environmental movement and local concerns about dwindling 
forest resources and biodiversity, the area under national parks, wildlife sanctuaries and 
watershed conservation zones in Thailand was expanded to more than 15% of the 
country’s territory in 2003, exceeding the average percentage of protected areas (PA) in 
other Asian countries by nearly 50% (World Resources Institute 2003) and disregarding 
the fact that the major share of the newly declared protected areas has been inhabited 
for many decades by ethnic minority people.  In many cases, lowland people have taken 
advantage of the tenure insecurity of local communities and encroached onto hillsides in 
order to establish large-scale plantations, appropriate land for speculation or engage in 
illegal logging activities (Neef et al. 2006).  In Vietnam and Lao PDR land allocation pro-
cesses have focused on increasing tenure security for individual farm households, but 
have largely failed to secure communal forms of forest resource management.  To date, 
the rights of local communities in highland areas to manage forest resources have not 
been endorsed by law.  The governments of both countries have taken measures to phase 
out swidden cultivation, although long-term research on composite swiddening agricul-
ture (CSA) in the northwestern mountains of Vietnam suggests that CSA is a dynamic 
system appropriate for less densely populated mountainous areas, in fact causing low 
rates of deforestation and soil loss.  It was found that CSA can actually enhance household 
resilience and—against all odds—helps to lift people out of poverty (Tran Duc Vien et al.
2006).
Efforts of government extension services and development projects to introduce 
soil and water conservation measures have largely failed in Southeast Asian watersheds 
because they concentrated on the technical feasibility and potential ecological effects of 
these measures, while neglecting economic viability and socio-cultural acceptance.  In 
Thailand, 22 technologies and 14 approaches for soil and water conservation on steep 
slopes available for extension and implementation have been identified in the late 1990s, 
ranging from mechanical structures to biological methods (El-Swaify and Evans 1999). 
Twenty years earlier, one of the very first integrated watershed projects in northern 
Thailand, the Mae Sa Integrated Watershed and Forest Land Use Project supported by 
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UNDP and FAO, had already come up with a myriad of similar agronomic and engineering 
conservation measures, such as terraces, check-dams, vegetative barriers and mulching 
(FAO 1976).  Yet, rates of adoption have remained miserably low.  Demonstration plots 
with a variety of “sustainable conservation measures” established by the Department of 
Land Development in cooperation with international projects since the late 1980s in Mae 
Hong Son province have not convinced local farmers in the area to adopt these measures 
in their own fields.  The Sloping Agricultural Land Technology (SALT) model developed 
in the Philippines has been exported to Vietnam and promoted as a “best practice” 
approach (Peters 2001), although its uptake by upland farmers in the Philippines has also 
stagnated at a very low level.  Upland farmers in Vietnam cited high demand for labor 
and competition with other crops for land and sunlight as the main reasons for the low 
rate of adoption (Friederichsen 1999; Peters 2001).  Today, the classical hedgerow sys-
tems of the SALT model are primarily practiced by “model farmers” and found mostly 
in areas where farmers received subsidies for their establishment (Thai Thi Minh 2010; 
Saint-Macary et al. 2010).
In the early 1990s several authors have already cited the major reasons why farmers 
do not adopt technical innovations that intend to improve ecological sustainability of 
upland agriculture, the most prominent among them being (1) farmers practice is equal 
or better than the proposed innovation, (2) the innovation is technically not feasible, (3) 
the innovation is too costly and too time-consuming, and (4) social, institutional and 
cultural factors (e.g. Fujisaka 1994).  These factors, however, tend to be ignored by the 
agricultural research and extension systems which continue to deliver supply-driven 
“best practices” developed under controlled conditions that rarely stand the test in 
farmers’ fields.
II-2 Focusing on the Economic Dimension of Sustainability Only: The Market-Driven
Approach
As opposed to the state-paradigm in forest protection and resource conservation, agri-
cultural crops in the uplands of Southeast Asia have been largely left to market forces. 
In Thailand, for instance, price stabilization measures by the government have focused 
nearly exclusively on typical lowland crops, such as paddy rice and longan, while farm-
gate prices for classical upland crops, i.e. cabbage, litchi and coffee, are formed by demand 
and supply mechanism and the negotiation power of middlemen.  In Vietnam, the boom-
ing animal feed industry has become a major driving force for the introduction of high-
yielding varieties of corn and the rapid expansion of corn cultivation in the northwestern 
uplands.  Commune extension workers increasingly supplement their low salaries by 
working under contracts of private seed suppliers (Nguyen Duy Linh et al. 2006; 
A. NEEF252
Friederichsen 2009), thus favoring the more commercial farmers and drawing the public 
extension service into the market domain, at the expense of the more marginal groups 
of farmers.  In Lao PDR, the influence of Chinese investors has increased dramatically 
in recent years as exemplified by the expansion of rubber plantations on sloping land 
(Thongmanivong et al. 2009; Friederichsen and Neef 2010).  Rubber is regarded by the 
Laotian government as a viable alternative to shifting cultivation which it vowed to elim-
inate by 2010.  However, the short- and long-term consequences of the rubber boom on 
food security of the upland poor remain unclear.  In Bokeo province, for instance, there 
are already strong indications that the more entrepreneurial ethnic minority groups, such 
as the Hmong—partly backed by remittances from relatives in the United States—will 
be the main winners of this new trend, while the food security and rural livelihoods of 
recently relocated forest-dwelling groups like the Khmu may be seriously compromised 
due to a rather slow economic adaptation and a lack of lowland paddy areas, making these 
groups more dependent on food crops from swidden fields (Friederichsen and Neef 
2010).   Rubber plantations and their adverse effect on plant biodiversity are also likely 
to dramatically diminish the availability of non-timber forest products, such as paper 
mulberry or bamboo shoots, which are important sources of food and cash income at 
times when food from field crops is not available and households suffer from a lack of 
liquidity, particularly in the dry season and the beginning of the rainy season (e.g. Neef 
et al. 2010).  Ecologists have also issued warnings against the potentially negative hydro-
logical impacts of rubber expansion (e.g. Ziegler et al. 2009).
The one-sided emphasis on market-driven agricultural development has induced 
typical boom-and-bust cycles in many upland regions of Southeast Asia.  In the northern 
Thai highlands, for instance, opium poppy cultivation was gradually substituted by suc-
cessions of coffee, corn, litchi, cabbage and—more recently—by sweet pepper, tangerine 
and cut-flower production.  Apart from compromising the resilience of farm households 
towards price fluctuations and sudden market slumps, the sole focus on market forces 
as drivers of upland development makes attempts to establish ecologically sustainable 
cropping systems extremely difficult.  In the northern Thai hillsides many farmers have 
recently switched from fruit-based agroforestry systems to erosion-prone vegetables or 
to pesticide-intensive production of cut-flowers which currently yield much higher prices 
than fresh fruits.  The Free Trade Agreement for fruits and vegetables concluded between 
Thailand and China in October 2004 has caused an influx of temperate and subtropical 
fruits, such as apples and tangerines, from Southwest China which—along with the 
expansion of domestic fruit orchards—has drastically reduced prices for locally produced 
fruits (Neef et al. 2006).  In northwestern Vietnam, plum production has been affected by 
a similar boom-and-bust cycle, causing many farmers to replace them by more profitable 
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and more flexible hybrid corn cultivation with adverse effects on soil erosion and eco-
logical sustainability (Friederichsen and Neef 2010).
The boom-and-bust cycles are characterized by a situation where large and innova-
tive farmers are able to adopt a new crop or a new technology first.  Risk-averse small-
holders, in contrast, often join the boom period too late, at a time when prices have already 
peaked and start to decrease due to the oversupply in the market.  Thus, the major 
beneficiaries of the new technology are the larger producers, who are able to capture the 
windfall profit, while small farmers are increasingly trapped in the price squeeze: they 
have to spend more on input supply and labor, while suffering from already declining 
prices.  As a consequence, their profit margins may not be sufficient to repay their loans, 
and they will find themselves caught in a downward spiral of indebtedness and declining 
incomes.  This phenomenon—which has been described by some scholars as the “agri-
cultural treadmill” (e.g. Röling 2003)—has become increasingly prevalent in the South-
east Asian uplands, particularly in areas where new technologies have gone along with 
high initial investments of labor and capital, such as planting of rubber trees in Laos or 
establishment of greenhouses in Thailand.  Hence, what may be regarded as a huge suc-
cess in terms of adoption of new crops and related technologies often has a differential 
economic and social impact on adopters.  An additional flipside of the Southeast Asian 
crop booms has been the dramatic increase in land values and the associated rise of large-
scale land acquisitions since the mid-2000s in many places (e.g. Hall 2011).
II-3 (Over-)emphasizing the Social Dimension of Sustainability: The Community-Driven
Approach
The apparent failure of both state and market mechanisms to enhance sustainable  natural 
resource management in the Southeast Asian uplands has stimulated movements towards 
community-based resource management.  The major argument put forward in support 
of such institutional arrangements as community forestry and community-based water 
management is that “people who live close to a resource and whose livelihoods directly 
depend upon it have more interest in sustainable use and management than state author-
ities or distant corporations” (Li 2002, 265).  The comparative advantage of communities 
is seen in the conservation of common-property resources, such as forest, grazing land 
and water that are essential for community members’ livelihoods and in the provision of 
social safety nets for disadvantaged members in times of crisis, e.g. natural catastrophes 
(cf. Scott 1976).  While the state is regarded as an organization that forces people to adjust 
their resource allocations through command and control mechanisms and the market is 
seen as an institution coordinating profit-seeking individuals through competition, the 
community is described as the organization that “guides community members to volun-
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tary cooperation based on close personal ties and mutual trust” (Hayami 2004, 3).
While there are numerous examples of successful community-based resource man-
agement in the Southeast Asian uplands (e.g. Prasert 1997; Tyler 2006) and scholars 
have described in much detail the necessary prerequisites for collective action in support 
of resource conservation (e.g. Ostrom 1990; 2001; Agrawal 2001), critics have warned 
the advocates of purely community-based natural resource management of being overly 
naïve about human nature and about existing power relations within local communities. 
Guijt and Shah (1998, 1) state that the “mythical notion of community cohesion” con-
tinues to permeate many development and natural resource management projects that 
try to follow a participatory ethic and build on the community as the sole organization in 
support of a more sustainable resource management.  It is more realistic to see the 
community as “the site of both solidarity and conflict, shifting alliances, power and social 
structures” and of “exclusion as well as inclusion” (Cleaver 2001, 45).  The perception 
of communities as homogeneous, peaceful and equitable entities tends to pay insufficient 
attention to internal differentiation by gender, ethnic origin, age, and social position and 
to conflicting interests among the various subgroups.  For instance, in a study of the 
damar forest gardens in Krui, Sumatra (Indonesia), Djalins (2011) finds that the revival 
of the adat institution—a customary law governing community-based resource manage-
ment—actually empowered traditional local elites, while sidelining the common damar
farmers and weakening their social position in the community.  Similarly, Doolittle (2011) 
highlights the varying—and often conflicting—strategies of community members in 
securing their access to land and other natural resources in a study in Sabah, Malaysia.
It is also important to take into account that the “village community” is not always 
the most important reference group of individuals in rural areas.  As Francis (2001, 79) 
holds “collectivities above and below the community level (such as individual, household, 
lineage, work-group, occupational association) are frequently the critical units for decision-
making and action.”  For the Hmong, an ethnic group living in South China, Laos, Thai-
land and Vietnam, membership of a clan is much more important than membership of a 
village community.  Only recently, cooperation across clan (and even ethnic) boundaries 
has become more frequent, for example in managing small-scale upland irrigation sys-
tems (Neef et al. 2005; Badenoch 2009).  In some villages in northwestern Vietnam, 
composed of different ethnic groups due to spontaneous migration and government-
driven resettlement, each village group may have an individual “community” leader.  In 
some areas of northern Laos many village communities have been disrupted by continu-
ous resettlements in recent years which have shattered their potential for collective 
action and community-based management.  In the uplands of the Philippines and Indo-
nesia, indigenous people and migrant groups are often forming heterogeneous communi-
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ties, competing for the same resources and making community-based efforts to protect 
forest resources difficult if not elusive (e.g. Cronkleton et al. 2010).  These are only some 
examples of the complexity of social structures and processes in rural areas that challenge 
the overly simplistic view of “village communities.”  In response to the criticism of 
oversimplified notions of community and community-based natural resource manage-
ment, scholars have developed more diverse and flexible concepts of how communities 
are “constructed,” encompassing both locality-based and network-oriented approaches 
to community (Vandergeest 2006).  Such differentiations are important contributions that 
open new pathways towards newly evolving concepts in integrated watershed manage-
ment, such as co-management and multi-stakeholder partnerships discussed in the 
following section.
III Towards Incentive-Based Policies and Partnerships in Mountainous 
Watersheds of Southeast Asia
Drawing on a review of recent literature and lessons from initiatives developed in the 
framework of a long-term collaborative research program in Thailand (The Uplands 
Program), this section presents a comprehensive approach for devising incentive-based 
policies and establishing multi-stakeholder partnerships that can bridge the ecological, 
economic and social dimensions of sustainable watershed management in the Southeast 
Asian uplands.  The major elements of this approach are collaborative natural resource 
governance, payments for environmental services (PES), and rural processing and 
marketing networks as depicted in the triangle of Fig. 2.
III-1 Collaborative Natural Resource Governance: Bridging the Ecological and Social
Dimensions of Sustainability
While community-based institutions have a potential for enhancing sustainable resource 
management in a certain locality if the social cohesion within local communities remains 
intact and elected local authorities can be held accountable for their actions, the intercon-
nectedness of communities and stakeholders in a watershed context calls for approaches 
that extend beyond the scale of village territories.  Collaborative forms of resource 
govern ance or co-management arrangements have recently been discussed as alterna-
tive approaches towards integrated watershed management (e.g. Persoon et al. 2003; 
Cronkleton et al. 2010).  Such institutional arrangements are based on the realization that 
leaving common-pool resources to be owned, managed and protected by one single 
agency or institution is rarely efficient taking into account the multiple services and 
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functions of natural resources for individuals and communities.  Collaborative resource 
governance calls for a holistic approach in agricultural and environmental policies.  In 
Southeast Asian countries, however, agencies responsible for agricultural development, 
water resource departments and forest agencies traditionally tend to work independently 
of each other, often being assigned to different ministries; cooperation is rare or even 
non-existing (e.g. Heyd and Neef 2006).  Agricultural policies and allocation of agricultural 
land are mostly shaped distinctly from forest legislation and forest allocation.  Only if 
these policies are made more consistent and transparent can they provide a basis for the 
design and establishment of co-management and a more sustainable use of agricultural 
land, water, trees and forests by multiple users.  An important prerequisite for the suc-
cess of collaborative governance is that policy-makers and officials of the various govern-
ment line agencies abandon their dual skepticism against the management capacity of 
local communities in general and, in particular, the potential of marginal ethnic minority 
groups to conserve natural resources when provided with the right incentives, e.g. in the 
form of rewards for environmental services, as discussed in the next subsection, and 
appropriate institutional arrangements, such as more pluralistic governance structures 
and tenure regimes.
Understanding the motivations of individuals and groups to participate in con-
servation and protection of common-pool resources is crucial for the success of such 
co-management arrangements.  The problem with most co-management arrangements 
is that the state with its various agencies often remains the most powerful actor, setting 
Fig. 2 Approaches to Bridge the Social, Ecological and Economic Dimensions of
Sustainable Watershed Management
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the rules of the game.  In Thailand, this has become evident in the process of establish-
ing river basin and watershed committees, where stakeholder representation has 
remained somewhat arbitrary and agendas are still dominated by central government 
agencies (Neef 2008).  Hence, an important question in establishing such co-management 
arrangements is the degree of devolution of natural resource management to local actors, 
i.e. to what extent are powerful political actors, such as forest agencies and irrigation 
departments, willing to release authority, power, and control of resources to less power-
ful actors at the local or regional level (cf. Agrawal and Ostrom 1999).  Enhancing local 
control of and legal access to natural resources under collaborative governance regimes 
is also an important prerequisite for the second element of sustainable watershed manage-
ment in Southeast Asian uplands, i.e. payments for environmental services (PES).
III-2 Payments for Environmental Services: Bringing the Ecological and Economic 
Dimensions of Sustainability Together
Mountain ecosystems are increasingly recognized as public goods, implying that public 
support for conservation programs and for direct payments for land managers providing 
environmental services is justified (Heidhues et al. 2006).  Payments for environmental 
services (PES), an approach that tries to overcome market failures in managing environ-
mental externalities, is increasingly discussed as a promising conservation policy mea-
sure in the Southeast Asian uplands (e.g. Rosales 2003; Suyanto et al. 2005; Lebel and 
Rajesh 2009; Neef and Thomas 2009; Chapika et al. 2009).  The central argument is that 
watershed and forest protection creates ecological services, such as carbon sequestration, 
biodiversity, erosion and flood control, clean drinking water, or landscape beauty, for 
which providers should be compensated.  PES has been defined as a voluntary transaction 
of one or more well-defined environmental services (or land uses that are likely to provide 
such services) that are “bought” by at least one service buyer from at least one service 
provider if the latter secures the provision of such environmental services (Wunder 
2005).
The crucial question is how to design such compensation schemes and how to com-
bine them with broader development efforts.  In reviewing several studies on PES pilot 
schemes in various Southeast Asian countries, Neef and Thomas (2009) extracted the 
following sets of prerequisites for functioning PES “markets”:
• Identification of the PES market: Before a PES scheme can be implemented, three 
basic components need to be identified: the specific environmental service(s) that are 
“traded,” the potential providers, i.e. “sellers,” of the service(s) and the potential 
“buyers” of the service(s) that need to have a long-term commitment.
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• PES processes and relationships: After the identification of the PES market compo-
nents, several key processes and relationships need to be developed in close collabo-
ration with stakeholders.  The type of rewards to be provided must be agreed upon, 
as well as the specific rules for deciding under which conditions rewards will be 
 allotted or denied.
• Institutional environment of PES: This third set refers to the various parameters that 
characterize the broader institutional context in which a PES scheme is embedded. 
Trustworthy intermediaries, appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks and secure 
resource rights have proven particularly important in pilot projects (ibid.).
A cross-country comparative study by Leimona et al. (2009) in the context of the long-
term research program “Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services—RUPES” 
in several Asian countries recommended four important attributes of successful PES 
schemes, namely (1) realistic, (2) conditional, (3) voluntary, and (4) pro-poor.  Yet the 
authors also found that cash payments in the projects studied were often too insignificant 
to have a broader impact on poverty alleviation and to provide sufficient incentives for 
land use changes (ibid.; see also Ahlheim and Neef 2006; Munawir and Vermeulen 2007; 
Milder et al. 2010).  These findings have two major implications: first, financial payments 
for ecosystem services need to be complemented by in-kind rewards, such as allocation 
of long-term resource rights, human capacity development and/or strengthening of 
partner ships with forest agencies, which underscores the strong connection between 
PES and collaborative natural resource governance.  Second, PES is not a sufficient 
means to alleviate rural poverty in upland watersheds and thus needs to be complemented 
by other remunerative activities.  This brings us to the third strategic element of sustain-
able development of mountain watersheds, the strengthening of rural processing and 
marketing networks.
III-3 Rural Processing and Marketing Networks: Integrating the Social and Economic
Dimensions of Sustainability
The future development of the agricultural sector in Southeast Asia is likely to be driven 
by dynamic economic developments in urban centers bringing about an increase in the 
demand for high-value agricultural products, like fruits and livestock products.  In the 
uplands of Southeast Asia such commodities with higher productivity in terms of land 
and labor and competitive product quality will have the best chance of ensuring food 
security for farm families, even on small farms, by providing adequate agricultural 
incomes.
Upland farmers in Southeast Asia have a long history of simply providing raw mate-
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rials to lowland areas and urban centers and traditionally depend on middle(wo)men as 
the main links in the supply chain, leading to patron-client relationships where farmers 
have virtually no bargaining power with regard to prices.  In a recent study of paper 
mulberry (Broussonetia papyrifera) value chains in northern Laos, we found that 100% of 
this non-timber forest product (NTFP) was traded via middlemen and less than 5% of 
the farmers knew what kind of final products were manufactured from the paper mulberry 
bark (Neef et al. 2010).  Most smallholder fruit production in the uplands of northern 
Thailand and northern Vietnam is traded via market intermediaries that often also play 
an important role in credit supply and provision with agro-chemicals.  Processing and 
retailing of fruit products have been largely confined to medium- or large-sized companies 
in peri-urban areas and lowland cooperatives run by the majority ethnic groups (Thai and 
Kinh respectively).
The rapid expansion of supermarkets in Southeast Asia and the emergence of niche 
markets in the field of organic and fair trade food products both domestically and inter-
nationally provide opportunities for upland farming communities to engage in new part-
nerships with the commercial sector, but individual farmers are often not able to supply 
sufficient quantities and are ill-prepared in coping with higher quality, i.e. food safety, 
standards.  They are also in a weak position to negotiate higher prices, given the power 
differentials between smallholders and large retailers.  While contract farming arrange-
ments have become popular in the more accessible parts of the Southeast Asian uplands,2)
few studies and even fewer development efforts have paid attention to the possible role 
that village cooperatives and inter-village networks could play in negotiating better terms 
of trade for small farmers in Southeast Asian upland watersheds.  Vermeulen et al. (2008) 
hold that small-scale farmers need to be integrated into modern value chains by more 
inclusive and transparent multi-stakeholder processes.  Ideally, upland farmers would 
need to build on and strengthen their social capital, form processing cooperatives and 
marketing alliances, and engage in new economic networks and partnerships with public 
and private actors.  In setting up such multi-stakeholder partnerships, the provision of 
services and investments that help upland people overcome isolation and get access to 
information, innovations and output markets are of crucial importance.
2) Studies on the impact of contract farming on Southeast Asian smallholders’ livelihoods are incon-
clusive.  In a study on sweet pepper contract farming in a northern Thai watershed, Schipmann and 
Qaim (2011, 676) find, for instance, that “contract marketing channels are associated with higher 
net incomes.”  Yet the study could not determine any statistically significant gross margin differ-
ences between company and village trader contract suppliers.  Their findings also suggest that 
farmers generally prefer non-contract marketing options.  This result is supported by a study on 
contract farming of fruit and vegetable in Peninsular Malaysia (Man and Nawi 2010).
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As in the case of the other two elements of the sustainable watershed management 
approach—i.e. collaborative natural resource governance and payments for environ-
mental services (PES), described in subsections III-1 and III-2—effective collective 
action mechanisms and trustworthy intermediaries3) are crucial prerequisites for success 
of such multi-stakeholder networks.  In the following subsection, I provide empirical 
evidence of how multi-stakeholder partnerships towards sustainable watershed manage-
ment can work in practice by combining the three strategic elements in a comprehensive 
approach and by attempting to balance the interests and capacities of actors whose rela-
tionships have traditionally been characterized by strong power differentials.  The case 
study does not claim, however, that such multi-stakeholder partnerships are a panacea 
for solving all problems related to upland watershed management.  Rather than present-
ing an idealized and one-size-fits-all framework, the case intends to illustrate the prin-
ciples of a more integrated approach to watershed management in the Southeast Asian 
uplands that does justice to the heterogeneity of actors and the ecological, social and 
economic challenges facing these areas.
III-4 Making Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships toward Sustainable Watershed Governance 
Work: The Case of Ban Mae Sa Mai and Ban Mae Sa Noi in Chiang Mai 
 Province, Northern Thailand
Ban Mae Sa Mai and Ban Mae Sa Noi are two Hmong villages located at around 1,200 m 
above sea level in Mae Rim district about 35 km northwest of Chiang Mai city.  Although 
administratively divided into two villages since the mid-2000s, the more than 200 families 
have a history of forming a single settlement.  Being within the boundaries of the Doi 
Suthep-Pui National Park (Fig. 3), villagers have virtually no secure land titles, but are 
allowed to practice agriculture to a certain extent, as they had settled in their present 
location before the establishment of the park in 1981.  After opium cultivation was phased 
out in the 1970s, farmers mostly have grown litchi trees4) and various kinds of vegetables 
as cash crops.
3) In the case of contract farming, trust between suppliers and buyers is also deemed indispensable 
(cf. Schipmann and Qaim 2011).  Yet the issue of trust becomes even more important when the 
number of actors in the socio-economic network increases, which calls for neutral and trustworthy 
intermediaries that help aligning actors’ expectations and leveling power differentials among 
them.
4) Litchi trees were regarded as a more sustainable land management practice by national park author-
ities and other government officials and they therefore equipped villagers with some form of tenure 
security in the absence of legal ownership rights.
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Networking for Collaborative Forest Management and Payments for Environmental
Services
Despite their reputation of being notorious shifting cultivators and forest destroyers, the 
two Hmong villages have a 25-year-long history of forest conservation in close collabora-
tion with both state and non-state actors.  Their ancestors have practiced the ntoo xeeb
(pronounced as “dong seng”) ceremony for 200 years.  This ceremony is dedicated to 
the guardian spirit of the village, believed to reside in the tallest tree on the hill above 
the settlement.  In 1985, the shaman responsible for the ceremony together with local 
leaders declared an area of about 16 ha surrounding the ntoo xeeb to be a ritual forest, 
where villagers are not allowed to cut any trees.  In the early 1990s several village mem-
bers established the “Natural Resource and Environment Conservation Club,” an organ-
ization that encouraged fellow villagers to use forest resources in a more sustainable way. 
The protected area around the ntoo xeeb was subsequently expanded to nearly 400 ha and 
various forest rules and penalties for trespassers were drafted (Prasit 2004).  The annual 
ntoo xeeb ceremony was widely publicized and promoted among district and sub-district 
administrators and representatives of various government line agencies.  The traditional 
ceremony of worshipping the village guardian spirit was thus redefined into a manifesta-
tion of local people’s determination and ability to live in harmony with nature and protect 
Fig. 3 Location of the Study Villages in the Doi Suthep-Pui National Park, Northern Thailand
Source: Map by Peter Elstner (The Uplands Program)
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forest resources.
In cooperation with National Park authorities, firebreaks were established to protect 
both the state-managed forests and the communally protected forest areas.  Fire pro-
tection activities have been carried out annually from January to May since the late 
1990s.  In 1997, members of the “Natural Resource and Environment Conservation Club” 
got acquainted with the Forest Restoration Research Unit (FORRU), an international 
NGO affiliated with Chiang Mai University.  The NGO supported the establishment of a 
community-based tree nursery to produce tree seedlings from local species for reforest-
ation purposes.  Between 1998 and 2006, over 65,000 trees were planted on more than 
20 ha of former swidden cultivation land (FORRU 2009).  The World Wildlife Fund 
Thailand, the PATT Foundation and several private companies have since sponsored a 
number of forest restoration activities, including the establishment of a “Nursery and 
Education Centre” in 2007 and annual tree planting days.  For instance, a local news 
magazine—Citylife Chiang Mai—has financially supported the planting of 0.56 ha of 
forest annually since 2007 (Chiang Mai News 2011).  This area is capable of storing about 
268 metric tonnes of carbon, thus offsetting the company’s annual carbon output.  The 
case exemplifies that local payments for environmental services (PES) schemes can be 
realistic, conditional, voluntary and pro-poor as postulated by Leimona et al. (2009), par-
ticularly when a trustworthy organization—in this particular case an international NGO—
acts as an intermediary partner.  Conditionality and voluntariness on the side of both 
suppliers and buyers appear to work best in such a user-financed, localized PES scheme, 
in which the service buyers are the actual service users—as opposed to government- or 
donor-financed program where the service buyer is a third party.
The two Hmong communities were also part of an empirical study conducted by 
Chapika et al. (2009) that found that upstream farmers in the Mae Sa  watershed (which 
partly overlaps with the boundaries of the Doi Suthep-Pui National Park) would be 
willing to change their farming systems to more sustainable and environment- friendly 
practices on parts of their land (e.g. by planting grass strips against soil erosion and by 
adopting bio-insecticides and water-saving irrigation techniques) if adequate financial 
compensation was provided.  An interesting finding of this study was that the poorer 
groups among the upstream farmers were more likely to engage in PES schemes, because 
payments would provide a rather secure and regular benefit stream and the establishment 
of such schemes would enhance their tenure security in this  protected watershed area. 
If such a PES scheme could be implemented in the Mae Sa watershed, farmers in Ban 
Mae Sa Mai and Ban Mae Sa Noi would benefit from an annual flow of PES funds for 
conservation-oriented agriculture, in addition to the payments  supplied by private com-
panies for their annual tree planting activities.
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In sum, the integration of collaborative forest management and payment for eco-
system services in this multi-stakeholder partnership has provided the two ethnic minor-
ity communities with moderate financial and strong institutional support to enhance their 
livelihoods and build up a new reputation as forest guardians and environmental stewards, 
while contributing to an improvement of ecosystem services that are beneficial both for 
local residents and for downstream people and the wider society.  The two elements 
covered by the FORRU-initiated partnership were complemented by another multi-
stakeholder alliance—described in the following subsection—supported by an inter-
national research program and focusing on sustainable farming and agro-processing 
practices.
Establishing a Community-Based Litchi Processing and Marketing Network
Researchers of the University of Hohenheim’s Uplands Program5) together with Thai 
partner universities have worked with the same two Hmong ethnic minority villages (i.e. 
Ban Mae Sa Mai and Ban Mae Sa Noi) over a period of more than 10 years towards 
developing more environment-friendly agricultural production, with an emphasis on fruit-
based agroforestry systems.  However, litchi production systems in the area have faced 
a number of challenges in recent years, such as irregular yields, inadequate use of agro-
chemicals and declining trends of farm-gate prices for fresh litchis.  As a consequence, 
some farmers had already turned to growing vegetables, such as bell peppers in green-
houses and carrots, cabbages and lettuces on steep slopes, which—from an ecological 
point of view—are a much less sustainable alternative in erosion-prone hillsides of 
northern Thailand.
In 2007, several subprojects of the Uplands Program joined forces with Hmong 
villagers and various public and private actors to establish a network for community-based 
litchi processing and marketing in order to add more value to their fresh produce. 
Villagers from Ban Mae Sa Noi and Ban Mae Sa Mai were trained in litchi drying by the 
Faculty of Agro-Industry, Chiang Mai University.  With support from the Uplands Pro-
gram and its Thai partners the villagers have developed their own brand of dried litchi. 
Consumer acceptance studies have been carried out in order to analyze the market 
potential of such products.  The added value is intended to help participating villagers to 
sustain their fruit production systems.  The cooperative—which started with six house-
5) The Uplands Program is a Thai-Vietnamese-German collaborative research program that has con-
ducted research into sustainable land use and rural development in mountainous regions of north-
ern Thailand and northern Vietnam since July 2000.  The interdisciplinary program comprises more 
than 10 subprojects, spanning from agro-ecology, horticulture and fruit processing to economics, 
development policy and rural sociology.
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holds in 2007—expanded to 32 members in 2009, 25 of them being women who are known 
to be traditionally marginalized in the patriarchal Hmong society.  In 2008, the coopera-
tive became one of 10 finalists among 383 applicants in a global competition for the so-
called SEED award, an initiative of the United Nations’ Commission for Sustainable 
Development, supporting promising local, multi-stakeholder initiatives towards sustain-
able development.  In the 2010/2011 season, sales of dried litchi have generated revenues 
of around 30,000 Thai Baht (~US$950).  In 2011, a researcher from the Uplands Program 
has brokered negotiations with a large European fair trade company that wants to include 
dried litchi from the cooperative in their product portfolio.  This initiative is likely to 
further boost the cooperative’s success and may lay the foundation for an expansion to 
other villages.  Yet a key constraint remains the uncertain legal status of the two com-
munities which poses difficulties of registering the drying business under the Good 
Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certification scheme needed for sales in most retail out-
lets.  The Uplands Program together with its Thai partners has lobbied for a confirmation 
from the National Park authorities that the two communities have the right to perma-
nently settle in their present location.
In order to improve prices for fresh litchi, the Uplands Program also initiated col-
laboration with a large hypermarket chain that aims to buy directly from growers, thus 
bypassing the middlemen and guaranteeing higher prices.  The prospect of higher finan-
cial benefits has motivated farmers from several Hmong communities to comply with 
Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) guidelines monitored by the officials from the Depart-
ment of Agriculture.  They have organized themselves as an inter-village litchi growers’ 
network and adapted their cultivation methods and post-harvest practices to the buyer’s 
standards.  By the end of the 2009 season, more than 100 litchi growers had formally 
registered for GAP certification.  Due to their greater bargaining power as a coordinated 
group, Hmong growers received fairer and more transparent prices and gradually gained 
social recognition as a reliable partner in marketing ventures with large supermarket 
chains (Tremblay and Neef 2009).  In 2010 the network traded more than 100 tonnes of 
fresh litchi via this new marketing channel, generating revenues of over 2 million Thai 
Baht (~US$62,500) for its members.  A welcome side effect for the hypermarket chain 
was that it could advertise this new partnership with smallholder litchi growers on its 
website to improve its corporate image.
With support from the Uplands Program and its Thai partners, first contacts have 
also been established to connect Hmong litchi growers with European importers of eco-
friendly fruit products.  In 2010, the project started—in cooperation with a Thai export 
company—to promote GlobalGAP-certified fruit production for export to further enhance 
profitability and ecological sustainability of litchi farming.  Initial setbacks—a first ship-
Fostering Incentive-Based Policies and Partnerships for Integrated Watershed Management 265
ment of certified fresh litchi was rejected by the importer because one farmer did not 
comply with the strict agrochemical regulations—could be overcome by enhancing per-
sonal contacts between representatives of the export company and the farmer group and 
by working more closely with a reduced number of farmers in the subsequent season.6)
A Thai partner of the Uplands Program also introduced farmers to the technique of litchi 
wrapping with reusable paper bags during the ripening stage in order to protect the fruits 
from insect damage and to reduce the need for insecticide application.  This innovation 
is a major step towards enhancing further fresh litchi exports to the European Union with 
its strict food safety standards.
Over a period of four years, this multi-stakeholder partnership among ethnic minor-
ity farmers, researchers, private companies and various Thai government agencies has 
initiated a number of technical and socio-organizational innovations that have contributed 
(1) to reducing the use of hazardous agrochemicals (e.g. by wrapping of litchi fruits against 
major pest insects), (2) to adding value to agricultural raw material (by cooperative dry-
ing), and (3) to empowering upland farmers and strengthening their socio-economic 
status (by helping to diversify their marketing channels and to negotiate better terms of 
trade).  In sum, fostering these processing and marketing networks for high-value agri-
cultural products has equipped marginalized ethnic minority farmers with new skills and 
more entrepreneurial attitudes and—at the same time—built social capital and fostered 
new forms of collective action.  This has motivated the upland communities to shift to 
environmentally friendly agricultural practices on sloping lands, while complying with 
national and international food quality standards, thus contributing to land conservation 
in fragile mountain ecosystems.  In one of their regular network meetings, key farmers 
have recently expressed their determination to carry on their collaborative activities 
beyond the Uplands Program’s funding period.
IV Discussion and Conclusion
The empirical evidence provided in subsection III-4 suggests that multi-stakeholder 
partnerships can be successfully established with the aim of combining the various dimen-
sions of sustainable conservation and development of upland watersheds.  Such partner-
ships have the potential to induce a socially, institutionally and ecologically sustainable 
mix of agricultural production, ecological services and rural livelihood opportunities, if 
6) It is expected that the number of exporting litchi growers will increase again in the future, when 
the exporters have regained their trust in the farmers’ network.  International demand for fresh, 
GlobalGAP-certified litchi from Thailand exceeds the current supply.
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they lead to durable forms of cooperation based on increased social trust and converging 
expectations among the actors.  These multi-stakeholder networks require more poly-
centric and deliberative forms of governance (cf. Neef 2009), shared decision-making 
processes and a supportive legal framework.
The experience of the multi-stakeholder partnerships in the two Hmong communi-
ties in northern Thailand underscores the crucial role of voluntary, non-profit-seeking 
intermediary actors (an international NGO in the first case, an international research 
program in the second) that are accepted as trustworthy mediators by all stakeholders 
and can help align the various actors’ expectations from the partnership and reduce power 
differentials among them.  Such intermediaries are also essential for ensuring trans-
parency, accountability and trust in the relations among the stakeholders.  Conflicts of 
interests and occasional setbacks may be inevitable, particularly in the formative stages 
of such multi-stakeholder partnerships, but they may also motivate actors to adjust their 
strategies and/or diversify their relationships in the network.
Questions of transferability and sustainability of such multi-stakeholder partnerships 
certainly remain.  To date, such alliances have depended strongly on support from inter-
national actors: in the empirical case studies, FORRU and the Uplands Program have 
functioned as the most important nodes in the networks.  While both programs have 
gradually reduced the influence of foreign staff members and “handed over the stick” to 
local stakeholders, the networks still appear somewhat vulnerable if external assistance 
is entirely withdrawn.  Yet local researchers and national NGO staff are likely to take on 
the function of intermediaries, and funding could be provided by national research and 
development organizations.
Another major challenge is the issue of scaling up such initiatives, i.e. how to com-
bine the quality and depth of localized multi-stakeholder partnerships towards integrated 
watershed management with the need to reach higher levels of decision-making and 
address wider regional problems.  This would require, first, that policy-makers at the 
national level and technocrats in the various government line agencies acknowledge the 
multi-functional character of mountain watersheds, providing not only ecosystem ser-
vices for downstream residents, but also important rural livelihood opportunities, food 
security and social services for its inhabitants.  Second, officials from the various govern-
ment agencies would need to be motivated to minimize interagency competition and 
develop more comprehensive policies and plans—together with local administration, the 
private sector and upland communities—that are aimed at overcoming the (perceived) 
antagonism between conservation and development in upland areas of Southeast Asia. 
Third, the governments of Southeast Asian countries would need to relinquish at least 
some control over natural resources to local communities and provide codes of conduct 
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for public-private partnerships that ensure that uplanders can strengthen their engage-
ment with the private sector in a “level playing field” (cf. Faysse 2006).  Finally, upland 
communities need to be seen as skillful managers of diverse asset portfolios (private, 
collective, regional and even global assets) and thus as key partners in the search for 
finding sustainable solutions to the problems facing upland watersheds.  Yet this acknowl-
edgement would really require a “watershed change” in public thinking.
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